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INTERNATIONAL LAW-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-THE FIRST DEC-
ADE OF THE TATE LETTER PoucY-On May 19, 1952, the State 
Department announced in the Tate Letter1 a new policy with 
regard to the :filing of suggestions of immunity in suits against 
foreign sovereigns. The letter indicated that the Department would 
begin to follow a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.2 This 
meant that it would :file a suggestion of immunity if the case arose 
from acts of the foreign government or its agents which were of a 
purely governmental character (fure imperii), but would deny 
immunity in instances where the acts engaged in were of a com-
mercial or proprietary nature which could be carried on by any 
individual or corporation (jure gestionis). It is the limited purpose 
of this comment to summarize executive and judicial treatment of 
this policy, to point out some of the problems involved in imple-
mentation of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and to 
suggest changes which might help to alleviate some of these diffi-
culties. 
I. APPLICATION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
A survey of the relatively few recent cases involving the ques-
tion of immunity of a foreign sovereign suggests that the State 
Department has not followed the principles enunciated in the 
Tate Letter as closely as it might have. While there are instances 
where the State Department has specifically considered the nature 
1 The announcement of the State Department's decision to follow a restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity was made in a letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate to the 
Attorney General. See 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952), Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting 
Legal Adviser, to the Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman, May 19, 1952. 
2 Once before, in 1918, the State Department made a similar pronouncement. See 
Letter of Secretary of State Lansing to Attorney General Gregory, Nov. 8, 1918, 2 
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 429 (1940). However, the policy that Secre-
tary of State Lansing set forth in that letter was not followed by the Supreme Court 
as it declined to apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in Berizzi Bros. v. 
Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). 
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of the transaction involved and concluded that it was jure ges-
tionis, 3 other cases suggest that it has apparently considered it 
unwise to apply the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity in 
situations where it might have done so.4 
In New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea5 and 
in In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus./' the 
State Department specifically characterized the acts of foreign 
sovereigns as commercial in nature. In the Republic of Korea case, 
libelant's steamship was damaged by a Korean government ship 
which was aiding in unloading operations in the port of Pusan. 
The Republic of Korea claimed sovereign immunity, but the 
State Department refused to file a suggestion of immunity from 
suit on the grounds that "the particular acts out of which the cause 
of action arose are not shown to be of purely governmental charac-
ter."7 Likewise, in the Investigation of the Shipping Indus. case 
the State Department refused to suggest immunity in a proceeding 
involving the Philippine National Lines, an instrumentality of the 
Philippine government. In a reply to the Philippine Embassy's 
request for immunity the Department concluded: "Since it appears 
to the Department that the Philippine National Lines is engaged 
in commercial activities, the Department of State regrets that it 
cannot take the action requested in your note."8 
State Department action in these two cases indicates that it is 
at least willing to apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity. However, other cases suggest that it is not as firmly wedded 
to the restrictive theory as its action in these cases might suggest. 
In Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank9 the State Department 
declined to apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
when it conceivably might have done so.10 In this case the plaintiff 
3 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 
(D.D.C. 1960); New York &: Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
4 See, e.g., Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 
(Sup. Ct. 1959); Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 155 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 
2 App. Div. 2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956), afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 862, 166 N.Y.S.2d 309 
(1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 22 (1958). For later developments in the Stephen case, 
see 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961). 
5 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
6 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960). 
7 132 F. Supp. at 685. 
8 186 F. Supp. at 318. 
9 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
10 For a discussion of the State Department's treatment of this case, see Drachsler, 
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was suing to recover on a Soviet Union state note which had 
been issued to pay for equipment purchased from a British mining 
corporation. Although the transaction was one that could have 
been classified as "non-governmental" or "commercial" in nature, 
the State Department ignored this fact and suggested that the 
Soviet Union's request for immunity from attachment be honored. 
Similarly, in the protracted litigation of Stephen v. Zivnostenska 
Banka11 the State Department declined to apply the Tate Letter 
doctrine. A judgment restraining the transfer of assets of Ziv-
nostenska and Statni Banka held in New York financial institutions 
was entered and the Czechoslovak government claimed sovereign 
immunity with respect to the assets held in the name of Statni 
Banka. In a June 4, 1952 letter, the Department requested the 
Attorney General to instruct the United States Attorney to present 
"without argument or comment" the position of the Czechoslovak 
government.12 Although it passed on the request for immunity 
without comment, the State Department might have, as did 
Referee Hays in his handling of the same case,13 characterized 
certain acts of Statni as commercial in nature and refused the 
request as to assets arising out of commercial transactions. 
The actions of the State Department in the four cases con-
sidered above suggest that foreign policy considerations weigh 
heavily with the Department when it is passing on requests for 
immunity. In the two cases where the State Department expressly 
characterized the acts of a foreign sovereign as commercial in 
nature, the nations were Korea and the Philippines, both nations 
with whom we have had fairly amicable relations during recent 
years. On the other hand, the two cases where the Department 
refused to characterize acts as commercial in nature involved Iron 
Curtain governments with whom relations are generally strained. 
In circumstances such as these the political effect of granting or 
denying a request for immunity might well be considered to out-
Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 790 
(1960). 
11 155 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956), 
afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 862, 166 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1957), appeal dismissed, 356 US. 22 (1958). 
12 Quoted in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d Ill, ll3, 222 N.Y.S.2d 
128, 130-31 (1961). 
13 In his handling of the case Referee Hays did characterize certain acts of Statni 
Banka as commercial in nature and refused to allow sovereign immunity with respect 
to these transactions. See Record of Report of Referee Hays at 203. 
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weigh the benefit of uniformity of treatment which would result 
from a more consistent application of the restrictive immunity 
theory. Thus, although it is difficult to generalize from only four 
cases, it seems that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
tends to be a fair weather doctrine which is applied by the State 
Department only when it is politically expedient. This is not 
to say the Tate Letter policy has been ineffective. Although 
relatively few recent cases have dealt with the problem, it is pos-
sible that the Tate Letter policy has had a greater effect than 
might be apparent. Foreign commercial agencies may have re-
frained from raising the issue of sovereign immunity either be-
cause of respect for the new policy of restrictive immunity, or 
because the possibility of success in requesting immunity no longer 
outweighs the possible detriment to business relations with their 
customers. 
II. .APPLICATION BY THE JUDICIARY 
If the State Department makes no suggestion for immunity the 
judiciary may still decide for itself whether the proper requisites 
for granting immunity exist.14 And, in dealing with cases involving 
a question of immunity the courts seem willing to apply the restric-
tive theory independent of a suggestion by the State Department. 
For example, in Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp.,15 
a New York supreme court applied the restrictive theory to deny 
immunity to an agency of the Turkish government when there 
was no suggestion of immunity filed by the State Department.16 
More recently, a selling agency of the Dominican Republic was 
denied the defense of sovereign immunity on the ground that it 
was a "business agency of the Government of the Dominican 
Republic" and that the contract sued upon was a "commercial 
agreement."17 And, in a suit against the Republic of Cuba for 
failure to perform a contract, the restrictive theory of immunity 
14 See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945), where the 
Court noted that "in the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the 
political branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves whether all 
the requisites of immunity exist." 
15 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
16 Cf. Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
17 Pacific Molasses Co. v. Comite De Ventas De Mieles, 30 Misc. 2d 656, 219 N.Y.S.2d 
1018 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
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was used by the court to allow attachment of debts owed by persons 
in the United States to Cuba.18 
When the State Department applies the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, it is possible that its policy might be thwarted 
by a refusal of the judiciary to give effect to denials or sugges-
tions of immunity. However, this seems most unlikely since the 
well-established attitude of the courts is one of judicial deference to 
the State Department, based on a policy of avoiding embarrassment 
to the Executive.19 But there are limits on the effect that a sug-
gestion of immunity will have; courts are properly reluctant to 
let a suggestion by the Executive determine matters which are 
truly judicial in character. For example, in the Zivnostenska litiga-
tion the court indicated that it would determine matters involving 
the question of ownership of assets claimed by a foreign sovereign.20 
Furthermore, the New York judiciary has reminded the State 
Department that a court is the proper body to make the final 
determination of whether any legal rights of a foreign sovereign 
are actually involved21 or whether the sovereign has consented 
to be sued.22 Despite their show of independence there is nothing 
to indicate that there is a hostile attitude on the part of the judi-
ciary which stands in the way of effective implementation of the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. There are, however, 
major problems involved in the enforcement of the Tate Letter 
doctrine which remain to be considered. 
18 Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
10 See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945); Ex parte 
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943). 
20 See Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d lll, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 
138 (1961), where the court held: "We find that the suggestion of immunity docs 
not preclude judicial determination of title to the assets of the defendant in the custody 
of the court allegedly transferred in fraud of creditors of Statni Bank or the Republic 
of Czechoslovakia." 
21 See Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 923, ll9 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct.), 
afj'd, 281 App. Div. 861, ll9 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1953), appeal denied sub nom. Frazier v. 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., 283 App. Div. 655, 127 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1954), 
where the court noted that the State Department statement "means no more than that 
Peru is recognized by the State Department as a foreign sovereign which has and should 
be accorded such immunity from suit as a sovereign has under international law, and 
that there hence is still open for judicial determination the question whether or not 
this particular action actually does require an adjudication of a claim against a sov-
ereign ...• " 
22 United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944). 
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Ill. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. Difficulties in Characterization 
1147 
It has been suggested that one of the reasons why a restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity could not be effectively imple-
mented is the difficulty in characterizing acts as "commercial" or 
"non-commerical."23 Various ways of distinguishing the two classes 
of governmental activities have been proffered24 but all have been 
criticized as failing to provide a formula that will resolve all cases 
without question or doubt. At best they provide only a rough 
guide for the troublesome cases, and it seems that the problem of 
resolving doubtful, borderline questions of fact and law cannot 
be avoided. The problem then becomes one of determining what 
body is best equipped to decide the hard cases. Since the State 
Department's determination is made without formal hearing, 
without the benefit of advocacy, and without any of the other 
procedural safeguards that are the essence of a judicial proceeding, 
there is reason for concern over the lack of a more or less mechan-
ical formula that could be readily applied by the Department. If, 
however, the judiciary were to decide the question these proce-
dural safeguards would apply. Moreover, the judiciary has had 
considerable experience in similar legal characterization problems, 
and the fact that the theory chosen for distinguishing between 
commercial and non-commercial acts could not be applied without 
difficulty should not be a serious handicap to the implementation 
of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The lack of an 
automatic rule of characterization should cause no more trouble 
here than it does in any other area of the law, and indeed one 
might expect that a reasoned case-by-case development by the 
judiciary of the principles involved would result in more refined 
rules of characterization. 
B. Attitude of the Justice Department25 
Since the United States' attitude toward the immunity of a 
foreign sovereign is likely to affect the way in which our govern-
23 See, e.g., Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities for States, 28 
BRIT. Yn. !NT'L L. 220 (1951). 
24 For a brief discussion of altemative methods, see Bishop, New United States 
Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. !NT'L L. 93, 103-06 (1953). 
25 For a more detailed discussion of the problems raised in this section see Timberg, 
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ment is treated in foreign courts, it is natural that the Justice 
Department, the main agency responsible for defending our 
government in foreign courts, would oppose the restrictive theory 
and perhaps create pressures within the Administration against 
its implementation.26 If the State Department and the judiciary 
rigorously adhered to a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 
the Justice Department might be in an awkward position when it 
pleaded sovereign immunity to suits against our government 
arising out of acts which were essentially commercial in nature. 
Thus, the attitude of the Justice Department is likely to be a 
built-in limitation on a vigorous application of the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity. 
C. Procedural Problems 
I. Notice and Service of Process 
Assuming that both the State Department and the judiciary 
were willing to enforce the restrictive theory of immunity, there 
are procedural problems with respect to notice and service of 
process which might make actual implementation difficult. In 
rem admiralty actions seem to provide little problem of adequate 
notice.27 For example, if a government ship engaged in com-
mercial activities is involved in a tort, the injured party is entitled 
to a maritime lien on the ship. There is no problem of getting 
jurisdiction over the sovereign, for the court is only adjudicating 
rights in the ship28 and process does not need to be served. 
However, the question of how one satisfies the requirement of 
service of process becomes important in in personam actions. The 
ambassador of the foreign nation cannot be served, for the United 
States Code makes this a crime.29 Furthermore, in Oster v. Domin-
Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 
109 (1961). 
26 See Leonard, The United States as a Litigant in Foreign Courts, [1958] AM. Soc'y 
INT'L L. PROC. 95. 
ZI However, it should be noted that in a non-admiralty in rem or quasi-in-rem 
action there may be problems in satisfying the forum's procedural requirements if notice 
by publication is required. 
28 When the libelant gets a maritime lien on the ship, he becomes, in theory, a 
part owner of the vessel. The suit then becomes an action in the nature of a suit to 
quiet title. 
29 R.Ev. STAT. §§ 4063, 4064 (1875), 22 U.S.C. §§ 252, 253 (1958). 
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ion of Canada30 in which an attempt was made to serve process on 
the Dominion by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint 
to the Consul General of Canada, the court held that service in 
this manner was insufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. If the ambassador or the consul cannot be served with 
process to obtain in personam jurisdiction, one is faced with the 
problem of who may be served. As a practical matter if a nation is 
carrying on commercial activities, a government agency or corpo-
ration will probably be involved. Thus, service might be made on 
the head of the agency or corporation.31 However, this would still 
not solve the problem of service of process in a case like Oster 
where there is no government agency or corporation. If in per-
sonam suits against foreign governments are to be practical, it 
seems that the requirements for service of process should be relaxed. 
One of the most important purposes of service of process is to 
give notice of the litigation and of the charges being made. In the 
case of a sovereign there is no question of his whereabouts, and 
there is no difficulty in making sure that he receives fair notice. 
This means that the formal requirements which are necessary to 
make it more likely that a private defendant receives actual notice 
are not as applicable in the case of suits against a state. Thus, when 
dealing with a foreign sovereign or its agencies, it might be appro-
priate to relax the formal requirements of service of process and to 
say that as long as the sovereign received actual notice the technical 
method of imparting the information is immaterial. Alternatively, 
courts might be willing to accept a rule which would allow service 
to be made in the same way it is made when the sovereign is sued 
in its domestic courts. Although the exact method of serving 
process would vary according to the nation being sued, the proce-
dural requirements of the forum would be satisfied if the plaintiff 
followed the procedures required by the defendant's domestic law. 
2. Seizure of the Res 
In New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea32 the 
State Department refused to suggest that the Republic of Korea 
30 144 F. Supp. 746, (N.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956). 
31 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(6) relating to the service of process on a "state or mu-
nicipal corporation or other governmental organization ••. " and providing that service 
may be made on the chief executive officer. 
32 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
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was immune from suit, but it did note that the Tate Letter had no 
effect on the rule of international law that the property of a foreign 
sovereign was immune from attachment and seizure.33 Thus, the 
refusal to allow immunity from suit was of no practical conse-
quence because the jurisdiction of the court was based on the 
seizure of the Republic's ship under a writ of attachment. As long 
as the State Department adhered to the view that there could be 
no attachment in aid of obtaining jurisdiction, there could be no 
in rem or quasi-in-rem proceedings brought against a foreign 
sovereign. 
However, this view was modified in a June 22, 1959 letter from 
Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the State Department, to At-
torney General William Rogers in which Mr. Becker noted: 
"The Department is of the further view that, where under 
international law a foreign government is not immune from 
suit, attachment of its property for the purpose of obtaining 
jurisdiction is not prohibited. In many cases jurisdiction 
could probably not be obtained otherwise.34 
It now seems clear that the State Department has backed away 
from the stand that it took in the Republic of Korea case and 
recognizes attachments in aid of obtaining jurisdiction. However, 
it is also clear that the Department still adheres to its view that 
property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution. The 
June 22 letter goes on to say: 
"But the property so attached to obtain jurisdiction over 
the defendant government cannot be retained to satisfy a 
judgment ensuing from the suit because in accordance with 
international law the property of a foreign sovereign is im-
mune from execution even in a case where the foreign sov-
ereign is not immune from suit."35 
It would seem as though the policy expressed in Becker's letter 
would remove the barrier that was created to suits in rem and 
quasi-in-rem. This would be especially true in in rem proceed-
ings where the court is merely adjudicating rights in the property 
and, except in the special case of admiralty, does not use the 
33 See 132 F. Supp. 684, 687 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
34 Quoted in Stephen v. Zivnostenska, 15 App. Div. lll, 116, 222 N.Y .S.2d 128, 134 
(1961). 
35 Ibid. 
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property to satisfy a judgment against any individual or govern-
ment. On the other hand, the basic nature of a quasi-in-rem 
proceeding is that a defendant's interest in property is used to 
satisfy part of the judgment rendered in the proceedings. There 
would seem to be little point in allowing a quasi-in-rem action 
if the property is not subject to execution and the proceeds 
of the execution cannot be used in satisfaction of the judgment. 
Thus, even though the State Department now allows attachment 
quasi-in-rem in aid of obtaining jurisdiction, there do not seem 
to be any cases where a court has allowed quasi-in-rem attach-
ment for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction when they knew 
that the property could not be sold in execution of the judgment. 
But, even though the State Department refuses to allow execution 
on the property of a foreign sovereign, the fact that it allows a 
judgment to be reached can be helpful.36 This judgment could 
at least be used as the basis of negotiation between foreign offices; 
and, as a practical matter, most foreign governments would pay 
a judgment rendered against it in order to avoid political disputes 
that would result from the plaintiff's government pursuing the 
claim. 
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES 
This brief survey of the recent treatment of the Tate Letter 
doctrine suggests several changes that could be made to bring 
about a more effective implementation of a restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity. The most important are: 
(1) The judiciary should accept as a general rule of law the 
proposition that there is no immunity for suits against a foreign 
sovereign arising out of transactions that are purely commercial 
in nature. This principle is favored by the State Department in 
the Tate Letter, is followed in many foreign countries,37 and 
36 For example, in Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'! Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 
299, 307, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), the court noted: "It may be urged that 
an affirmative judgment against a foreign sovereign should not be permitted to be 
sought by a domestic litigant because such a judgment cannot be collected and thus 
the court may be placed in the embarrassing position of issuing an unenforcible decree. 
I would not be impressed with such a contention, were it presented." 
37 For discussions of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in other nations, 
sec SucHARITKUIL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1959); 
Castel, Immunity of a Foreign State from Execution: French Practice, 46 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 520 (1952); Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities for States, 28 
BRIT. Yu. INT'L L. 220 (1951); Lalive, L'immunite de jurisdiction des Etats et des Organisa-
tions internationales, 3 HAGUE ACADEMY INT'L L, RECUEIL DES COORS 205 (1953). See also 
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seems to be accepted by American courts who have recently dealt 
with the sovereign immunity question.38 
(2) The courts and not the State Department should decide 
whether an action is commercial or non-commercial. If a foreign 
sovereign feels that he is entitled to sovereign immunity, he 
should plead sovereign immunity as a defense and let the court 
decide if the underlying transaction is commercial in nature. 
If it is commercial, the foreign sovereign would be automatically 
subject to suit. The practical effect of this change would be that 
the ex parte administrative determination by the State Depart-
ment would be turned into a judicial hearing with all the benefits 
of advocacy and the safeguards of a judicial proceeding. 
(3) Although a foreign sovereign would be automatically sub-
ject to suit if a court found that the underlying transaction was 
commercial, the State Department should have a veto over actu-
ally allowing the action to proceed against the sovereign. If the 
State Department felt that there were overriding political factors 
involved, it could stop the litigation from proceeding on the 
merits.39 
(4) The requirements of service of process should be relaxed 
so that it would be easier to impart legal notice to a foreign 
sovereign. The most logical solution would seem to be one that 
allows service of process on the consul general, who presumably 
represents the commercial interests of his country abroad. Other 
possibilities would be to allow service on officials of government 
buying and selling agencies or to allow service in the same man-
ner that the sovereign is served in his home country. 
(5) If suit is allowed against a foreign sovereign, the property 
of the sovereign should be subject to execution.40 This is espe-
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (treatment of the problem of sov-
ereign immunity in England). · 
38 See, e.g., Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. 
Ct. 1961); Pacific Molasses Co. v. Comite De Ventas De Mieles, 20 Misc. 2d 560, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. lnt'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 
2d 229, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
39 The State Department's veto power would arise only after the judiciary had 
determined that the acts were commercial in nature. 
40 Perhaps the commonest argument for allowing execution on the property of a 
foreign sovereign is that whenever a government engages in commercial activities, it 
should be willing to accept the risks that go with these undertakings. One of these 
risks is that a judgment will be rendered against it and its property subject to execu-
tion. For a discussion of the degree to which European courts permit execution upon 
judgment or attachment against foreign sovereigns, see [1958] AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 
81, Panel II. 
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cially true in the case of quasi-in-rem actions where a judgment 
makes little sense if the property before the court cannot be used 
to satisfy the judgment. In such actions there would be few prac-
tical problems in the actual execution if the property is actually 
before the court. However, there seem to be potential problems 
in execution in the case of an in personam judgment where the 
judgment creditor has to seek out and levy on the property of the 
foreign government.41 Thus, it might be reasonable to distinguish 
between actions where the property is before the court and actions 
where it is not by at least allowing execution in the former class of 
actions. 
John M. Niehuss, S.Ed. 
-u For example, seizure of a government plane carrying diplomatic representatives 
to the nation of the forum might lead to an embarrassing international incident. 
